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Abstract
A number of OECD countries aim to encourage work integration of disabled persons
using quota policies. For instance, Austrian firms must provide at least one job to a disabled
worker per 25 non-disabled workers. Non-complying firms pay a tax for each job-month
missed. We study the role of this employment quota on firms’ demand for disabled workers.
Specifically, we compare firms that employ 25 non-disabled workers and are subject to the
non-compliance tax to firms that employ 24 non-disabled workers and are not subject to the
tax. Our results indicate that firms with 25 non-disabled workers employ about 0.04 (or
12 percent) more disabled workers than would be expected from smaller firms, employment
effects are stronger in low-wage firms than in in high-wage firms, and the quota generates
excess disabled employment on the order of 0.07 among firms located at non-disabled firm size
50 and higher. Two reforms of the system also suggest that increasing the non-compliance
tax increases excess disabled employment, whereas paying a bonus to over-complying firms
slightly dampens the employment effects of the non-compliance tax. These results are only
valid if we rule out strategic behavior in firms’ choice of non-disabled employment that
is related to the tax. We show in a simple behavioral framework that firms may indeed
manipulate non-disabled employment and that this manipulation can lead to either upward
or downward biases. Based on empirical estimates for manipulation we provide a lower and
upper bound for the causal effect of the quota on firms’ demand for disabled employment.
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Keywords: disabled workers, employment quota, financial incentives
∗We would like to thank the editor, Stefano Della Vigna, and three anonymous referees for comments that
helped substantially improve an earlier version of this paper circulated with the title ”Do Financial Incentives for
Firms Promote Employment of Disabled Workers? A Regression Discontinuity Approach”. Josh Angrist, David
Autor, Dan Hamermesh, Bo Honore´, Andrea Ichino, Andreas Kuhn, Michael Lechner, Enrico Moretti, Oliver Ruf,
Ian Walker, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and seminar participants at the labor seminar in Engelberg
(organized by the University of Zurich), at the University of Basel, at the University of St. Gallen, at the Royal
Holloway University of London, at the University of Lausanne, at the University of Zurich, and at the EALE 2007
in Oslo provided helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. We thank Dr. Hofer, Ministry
of Social Affairs, Vienna, and Dr. Konrad, Bundesrechenamt Vienna, for giving us access to the data. This paper
was funded by the Austrian National Bank (“Jubila¨umsfonds”, grant no. 12327). Financial support from the Swiss
National Science Foundation (grant no. PBZHP1-133428) and the “Forschungskredit” of the University of Zurich is
also gratefully acknowledged. Rafael Lalive, University of Lausanne, Department of Economics, CH–1015 Dorigny,
Rafael.Lalive@unil.ch; Jean-Philippe Wuellrich, University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Mu¨hlebachstrasse
86, CH–8008 Zurich, jean-philippe.wuellrich@econ.uzh.ch; Josef Zweimu¨ller, University of Zurich, Department of
Economics, Mu¨hlebachstrasse 86, CH–8008 Zurich, josef.zweimueller@econ.uzh.ch.
1 Introduction
Integrating disabled workers is a key challenge of employment policy. One out of seven individu-
als who live in OECD countries report a health problem that limits activities of daily life (OECD,
2003). Employment matters tremendously for disabled individuals’ economic well-being. The
work incomes of disabled individuals with a job are nearly as high as those of individuals with-
out a disability. In contrast, the financial resources available to a disabled individual without
a job are 46 % lower than the disposable income of an employed disabled individual. Even
though work is of crucial importance for disabled individuals’ material standard of living, their
employment rates are substantially below those of the non-disabled.
This paper studies whether an employment quota for firms can help to increase the demand
for disabled workers. Understanding the effects of quota is important for several reasons. First,
the two most important policies for encouraging employment of disabled workers among OECD
member countries are anti-discrimination legislation and employment quotas. While the effects
of anti-discrimination policies are quite well understood, the effects of employment quotas on
firms’ employment decisions have been explored much less. Second, labor economists have long
attempted to understand the importance of financial incentives in labor demand (Hamermesh,
1993). The employment quota policy allows studying firms’ reaction to a sharp change in the
relative cost of employing disabled and non-disabled workers. Third, legislation very similar to
that in Austria is in force in many other OECD countries (or has been so until very recently, as
in the U.K.; see table 1 for an overview). While these regulations have a core component in the
form of a mandatory employment quota in common, they differ in terms of the quota amount
(ranging from 7% in Italy to 2% in Korea and Spain), in terms of the target firms, and in terms
of the salience of non–compliance sanctions (ranging from 0.25% of the monthly pay-roll for
firms in Germany to 4% in Italy).
We study the case of Austria, where the Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA) defines
specific employment targets, coupled with financial incentives for meeting these targets. Austrian
firms have to hire at least one disabled individual per 25 non-disabled employees leading to quota
thresholds at firm size 25, 50, etc. Firms that fail to comply are subject to a tax of currently
223 e per month. The tax revenues are used to subsidize firms that provide employment to
disabled workers (regardless of whether they are subject to the employment quota or not). As
similar quota rules are in place in many other OECD countries, it is important to investigate
how the quota rule impacts employment.
In order to comprehensively capture the employment effects of the quota rule, it is crucial
to understand how quota affect firms’ employment decisions of both disabled and non-disabled
workers. Our empirical strategy exploits the discontinuous change in the relative cost of employ-
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Table 1: OECD Countries with Employment Quotas
Country Quota Targeted firms Sanction
Austria 4% private and public employers with over
25 employees
e 200 per month for each place not filled
(0.4% of payroll)
Belgium 2–2.5% only public employers –
France 6% public and private employers with over
19 employees
e 150–250 per month (0.45–0.75% of
payroll)
Germany 5% public and private employers with over
19 employees
e 100–250 per month for each place not
filled, depending on fulfillment (0.25–
0.65% of payroll)
Italy 7% public and private employers with over
50 workers, one/two places for 15–
35/36–50 employees
e 1,075 per month for each place not
filled (4% of payroll)
Korea 2% public sector and private employers
with over 300 employees
e 324 per month for each place not filled
(0.5% of payroll)
Poland 6% public sector and private employers
with over 50 employees
40.65% of average wage per month for
each place not filled (2.4% of payroll)
Spain 2% public sector and private employers
with over 50 employees
–
Source: OECD (2003)
ing disabled and non-disabled workers and provides us with a “threshold design”. We compare
(i) the number of disabled workers in firms just below and just above the quota threshold; and (ii)
the density of the firms size distribution – measured by non-disabled employment – just below
and just above the threshold. The basic idea is that when firms’ demand for disabled workers
is affected by these sharp changes in financial incentives at the quota thresholds, we should see
a discontinuity in disabled employment at the threshold. In this respect our threshold design is
closely related to the regression discontinuity design (RDD).1 However, the employment quota
may also affect employment of non-disabled workers since firms may manipulate employment
to avoid the non-compliance tax. This latter issue is key for the interpretation of our threshold
discontinuity results for disabled workers.
We explicitly address the question how manipulating employment of non-disabled workers may
bias the estimated quota effect on non-disabled employment (see McCrary, 2008). We develop
a simple behavioral framework that shows that manipulation can lead either to an upward or
a downward bias of the estimated threshold effect for disabled workers. The sign of the bias
depends on whether or not the productivity of disabled workers exceeds their wage.
The model is helpful as it lets us estimate bounds for the estimated quota effect. We first
check for employment manipulation. We show that, while the two populations of firms below
and above thresholds are very similar in terms of a range of observable characteristics, there is,
in fact, a significant (albeit small) discontinuity in the firm size distribution at the threshold.
Based on our model we use the estimated of firm-size discontinuity effect to provide a lower and
upper bound for the causal effect of the quota on firms’ demand for disabled employment. We
1The RDD has been used in a number of studies to measure causal effects. See Angrist and Lavy (1999),
DiNardo and Lee (2004), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Lalive (2008), for studies assessing the causal effects
of unions, social assistance, or unemployment benefits on labor market outcomes.
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conclude that, while manipulation bias cannot be ignored, even the lower bound of the quota
effect remains positive.
The empirical analysis documents four important results. First, firms facing the obligation
to employ disabled workers do in fact employ more disabled workers than similar firms without
this obligation. A comparison of firms just above the quota threshold to those just below
the threshold shows that roughly 4 in 100 firms around the first threshold (25 non-disabled
workers) have a disabled worker on the payroll whom they would have not hired in the absence
of employment quota. The average effect at higher order thresholds (50, 75, ...) is roughly twice
as large but imprecisely estimated. Both estimates suggest that firms are quite responsive to
the tax (the elasticity of substitution is around 1.60 for firms employing 25 non-disabled workers
and around 1.58 for firms hiring 100 non-disabled workers). These results allow us to assess
the extent to which firms incur losses from hiring a disabled worker. We find that about 35
% of all threshold firms incur no or only small losses from hiring disabled workers – with 31
% being indifferent between hiring an extra disabled worker or an extra non-disabled worker
and 4 % incurring losses that are smaller than the non-compliance tax. The remaining 65 %
of all firms do not comply with the regulation because the losses from doing so exceed the
tax. Second, we document important heterogeneity of the effects of employment quota with
respect to wages. We find that firms’ response to the per-head non-compliance tax decreases
monotonically with a firm’s position in the wage distribution. Third, we explore the extent
to which firms’ employment decisions merely reflect poaching from other firms rather than
creating or maintaining employment. We find that roughly 64 % of the employment effect can
be attributed to workers already employed by the firm on the date of acquiring formal disability
status. About 34 % of excess employment can be attributed to workers who were employed by
other firms at the time of acquiring disability status. The remaining 2 % of excess employment
goes to individuals who were not employed at the time of acquiring disability status. Fourth, two
reforms of the system suggest that increasing the non-compliance tax increases excess disabled
employment, whereas paying a bonus to over-complying firms slightly dampens the employment
effects of the non-compliance tax.
The existing literature has extensively studied the effects of anti-discrimination legislation
for disabled individuals. DeLeire (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and Beegle and Stock
(2003) find that the Americans with Disabilities Act has not improved employment of disabled
individuals in the U.S.. Kruse and Schur (2003) challenge this finding, pointing to imprecise
information on disability status. Jolls and Prescott (2004) and Jolls (2004) argue that the Act
increased education participation. Bell and Heitmueller (2009) find that the U.K. Disability
Discrimination Act did not have a significant impact on employment prospects for disabled
individuals. Wagner et al. (2001) find that employment quota did not generate a quota effect
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for disabled workers nor an impact on job dynamics in Germany.2 Wuellrich (2010) finds that an
increase in the non-compliance tax in Austria generated positive employment effects for disabled
workers.3
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the literature by
studying the impact of quota rules. While a large number of studies have looked at the effects
of anti-discrimination legislation with respect to disabled workers, we are not aware of previous
studies that evaluate the effect of quota on employment of disabled workers. Second, we provide
a simple theoretical framework that is helpful in interpreting the estimated quota threshold
effect in the presence of employment manipulation (”bunching”) by firms. Third, our evaluation
is based on high-quality data from Austrian private firms and their (disabled and non-disabled)
workers. We use the same data base that Austrian social welfare authorities use to determine
compliance with employment quota: the Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD) linked with data
from the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO). The former data set contains the universe of
Austrian firms and workers. The latter data set allows us to assess the formal disability status
of each worker. The data cover all of 46,467 Austrian private sector firms with employment
close to the quota threshold during 1996–2003(see Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009, for a description of
the ASSD).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the institutional
environment in Austria. Section 3 presents the behavioral framework. Section 4 describes the
data and the empirical strategy. Our main results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The Austrian Disabled Persons Employment Act (DPEA), implemented in 1970, forms the legal
basis of the Austrian employment quota system. It defines the process by which individuals
acquire the formal status “severely disabled”. It regulates the employment obligations for firms
and the financial sanctions associated with non-compliance; specifies subsidies to firms employing
disabled workers; and grants employment protection for disabled workers. Here we briefly discuss
the legal background that was in effect during January 1999 to June 2001 and we also discuss
two important reforms to this system that took place before and after this period.4
2See also Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez (2009) and Verick (2004) who study the effects of German anti-
discrimination legislation. Moreover, two strands of the literature study (i) the role of employment protection for
worker effort (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005), and (ii) the role of general employment protection provisions on firm
dynamics and firm size (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002; Borgarello et al., 2004). See also Welch (1976) for an early
theoretical attempt to characterize the effects of quota on the labor market.
3See also Humer et al. (2007) for an overview of the Austrian system and a descriptive account of disabled
workers’ career patterns.
4The DPEA regulates employment of severely disabled workers. Another important program in Austria that
targets disabled individuals is the disability insurance program (DI) which grants income transfers for disabled
individuals who have dropped out of the labor force permanently (see e.g. Staubli, 2010, for an investigation of
the impact of tightening the eligibility criteria for DI on labor force participation). Only 12 % of individuals who
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Employment quota The quota rule obliges firms to hire one disabled worker per 25 non-
disabled workers. Firms that do not comply with this obligation have to pay a non-compliance
tax of currently e 223 (2010) and stood at 150 e in 1999, roughly 8 % of a worker’s average
monthly salary. Enforcement of non-compliance is close to 100 %. The FWO checks firms’ em-
ployment obligation every month taking into account particular disabilities. (Blind individuals,
disabled individuals below age 19, above age 50 with a degree of disability of at least 70 percent
and above age 55 and individuals in a wheelchair are double-counted.) Disabled workers have
to be hired on the same type of contracts offered to non-disabled workers. The non-compliance
tax for disabled worker is the only labor market regulation that kicks in at a firm size of 25 non-
disabled workers (and multiples thereof). This means that contrasting firms with 25 employees
to firms with fewer than 25 workers really informs on the non-compliance tax rather than on
other labor market regulations.5
Acquisition of disability status To acquire the formal status of a ”severely disabled” in-
dividual a worker has to file an application with the FWO. The application is approved once a
medical expert assesses a physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory disorder which reduces the
individual’s work capacity by at least 50 percent. This procedure aims to rule out that the for-
mal status of a disabled individual can be obtained by fraud. While it cannot be ruled out that
the procedure is only triggered after a firm has crossed the threshold, pure relabeling of existing
workers is unlikely given the joint incentives of workers and firms. Workers gain in terms of
increased job protection. Firms gain in getting access to refunds for workplace accommodation
and wage subsidies (see below). In 2009, almost 95,000 individuals or 2.2 % of total employment
were registered as disabled according to the law.
Workplace accommodation and (wage) subsidies The DPEA also defines how non-
compliance tax revenues are to be spent. In 2009, these revenues amounted to e 88.2 millions.
Beneficiaries are both the firms employing disabled workers and the disabled workers themselves.
Firms employing disabled workers can get allowances for: (i) workplace accommodation (up
to e 25,000 and at most 50% of total costs involved, only firms with 50 or less non-disabled
employees are eligible); (ii) wage subsidies (at most e 700 a month for new entrants and up
to two years; at most e 650 or 50 percent of the wage for long-term employees with a major
reduction in work capacity; at most e 400 a month for apprentices; at most e 1,000 or 50%
of the wage for employees when the firm can credibly show that it needs to layoff the worker
are eligible for DPEA also receive a DI pension. Yet even though few individuals are covered by both programs,
the mere existence of DI might affect the employment effects of DPEA via its effect on reservation wages. Notice,
however, that DI in Austria is predominantly an early retirement program. (See Staubli, 2010, for an analysis of
DI incentives on employment of older workers.) DI take-up among younger individuals is comparably low.
5There is a discontinuity in labor regulations at firm size of 15 employees. Firms above this employment
threshold have to establish a works council.
6
without the subsidy); and (iii) work assistance (such as counseling the firm regarding the efficient
integration of disabled workers, a service provided free of charge by the FWO). These allowances
represent a reallocation of resources from firms that fail to comply with the quota rule to those
firms that employ at least one disabled worker. The reallocation is used to compensate the latter
for their effort in employing disabled workers. Allowances are available to all firms, including
small firms not subject to the quota rule.6
Disabled workers are eligible to allowances for the following purposes: vocational (re)training,
professional development, work assistance (counseling service), mobility enhancing measures
(e.g. provision of a guide dog), and formation of a subsistence securing self-employment (up to
e 60,000).
Employment protection The DPEA provides increased employment protection for disabled
workers, i.e. protection from dismissal and protection from wage cuts due to disability. The
increased protection against dismissal is twofold. First, it stipulates that a contract may only be
terminated after a notice period of at least four weeks. Second, dismissal is only valid if a special
FWO committee agrees to it. Dismissals without the consent of this committee are unlawful.
However, the increased dismissal protection comes into effect only after a probationary period
of three months has elapsed.
Policy Changes Two important reforms to the DPEA took place since the late 1990s. First,
on July 1, 2001 the non-compliance tax was increased from e 150 to e 196. Second, on January
1, 1999 a bonus for over-compliance was abolished. Before 1999, firms employing more disabled
workers than required by the quota rule were granted a bonus of e 150 for each excess disabled
worker. The 1999 reform and the 2001 reform also changed the probation period for disabled
workers, from 1 to 3 months in the first reform and from 3 to 6 month in the second reform. Our
empirical analysis (see section 5) will focus on the period January 1999 to June 2001. However,
we will provide additional results also for the preceding and subsequent periods to check the
robustness of our results.
3 A Simple Behavioral Framework
This section studies a simple model in which a quota threshold affects a firm’s decision to employ
disabled and non-disabled workers. We want to shed light on the issue of bunching and look
at firms around the threshold. Firms have to solve two discrete choice problems: (i) whether to
6Dyk et al. (2002) investigate take-up of allowances by firms. Almost 40% of firms employing disabled workers
receive an allowance with wage subsidies being the most important allowance. 86% of firms with an allowance
obtain a wage subsidy and about 6% obtain an allowance for providing adequate access to the premises and
workplace accommodation. 60% of all firms assess the existence of allowances as essential for hiring disabled
workers.
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hire non-disabled workers below or at (or above) the threshold; and (ii) whether or not to hire
a disabled worker.7 We assume that non-disabled workers have productivity P and disabled
workers have productivity p < P . Anti-discrimination legislation ensures the same wage w for
both types of workers.8 We assume P > w for all firms but allow for w < p in some firms and
w > p in others (i.e. firms differ in p). The quota threshold is defined on a discrete number
of employees, so it is reasonable to assume that labor is indivisible. However, product demand
Z is continuous (so firms either hire too few workers and ration Z; or they hire more effective
labor units than needed to produce Z).
No quota rule. We first look at employment decisions in the absence of a quota rule. A firm
that hires LN non-disabled and LD disabled workers makes profit
pi0(L
N , LD) = min(PLN + pLD, Z)− w(LN + LD).
Consider first optimal employment of non-disabled workers of the firm with product demand Z
(assuming firms do not hire disabled workers). Define “residual demand” as product demand
Z minus output produced by LN non-disabled workers, so R(Z,LN ) = Z − LNP . A firm with
0 < R(Z,LN ) < P will hire at least LN non-disabled workers and at most LN + 1 non-disabled
workers. Optimal non-disabled employment is characterized by a threshold rule: hire LN + 1
non-disabled workers if residual demand exceeds the wage rate R(Z,LN ) > w.
Now consider optimal hiring of a disabled worker. When p < w productivity falls short of the
wage rate and the firm is not willing to hire a disabled worker. However, when p > w some
firms are willing to hire. When residual demand is in the range R(Z,LN ) ∈ (w, p) the firm
is indifferent between hiring a disabled or a non-disabled worker. Both types of workers are
sufficiently productive to satisfy residual demand R(Z,LN ). No disabled worker will be hired
when residual demand is outside the range R(Z,LN ) ∈ (w, p). A firm with low residual demand,
0 < R(Z,LN ) < w would make a loss. A firm with high residual demand, p < R(Z,LN ) < P
would sacrifice profit since hiring a disabled worker generates less additional revenue than hiring
a non-disabled worker.
Employment quota with non-compliance taxes. Now assume a system in which firms
with non-disabled employment LN ≥ T need to hire one disabled worker whereas firms with
LN < T do not face such an obligation. Non-compliance with the quota rule leads to a tax
7The discussion focuses on the first threshold, i.e whether to hire 25 workers (or more) or 24 workers (or less).
However, the general logic generalizes to higher thresholds. For instance, at the second thresholds the firm has
to decide whether or not to hire 50 workers or more or 49 workers or less and whether to hire 0,1, or 2 disabled
workers, etc.
8Note that the assumption of fixed wages does not preclude substitution between disabled and non-disabled
workers since the non-compliance tax acts like an increase in the cost of non-disabled workers compared to disabled
workers.
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τ . Throughout we assume τ < w and τ < P − p.9 A firm that hires LN non-disabled and
LD ∈ {0, 1} disabled workers makes profit
pi1(L
N , LD) = min
[
PLN + pLD, Z
]− w(LN + LD) + min [LD − 1(LN ≥ T ), 0] · τ
where 1(LN ≥ T ) is an indicator taking value 1 if LN ≥ T and zero otherwise.
How does the quota rule affect employment decisions? It turns out that the answer depends
crucially on whether a disabled worker’s productivity p is larger or smaller that the wage w. We
discuss the two cases in turn.
Case 1: p < w. Such a firm is not willing to hire a disabled worker even under a quota
system. However, the quota system will affect employment of non-disabled workers. Consider
the decision of a firm whether to hire T or T − 1 workers of firms with residual demand 0 <
R(Z, T − 1) < P . In the absence of quota this firm will hire T workers when R(Z, T − 1) > w.
With employment quota a firm with residual demand R(Z, T − 1) ∈ {w,w + τ} employs only
T − 1 non-disabled workers. This ”bunching” occurs because the marginal cost of the T th non-
disabled workers equals the wage w plus the cost of crossing the quota threshold τ ; and because
residual demand R(Z, T − 1) ∈ {w,w + τ} is lower than this marginal cost. The firm is better
off setting employment at T − 1 and avoid the tax. Notice also that the quota system affects
only firms that would hire exactly T workers (or multiples of T ) while the employment decisions
of all other firms remain unaffected (though profits of firms with LN ≥ T are lower because of
the tax).
Case 2: p > w. When disabled workers’ productivity exceeds the wage, p > w, it depends
on residual demand whether or not the firm is willing to hire a disabled worker. Consider again
the decision of a firm whether to hire T or T − 1 non-disabled workers. Firms with low residual
demand 0 < R(Z, T − 1) < w are not affected by the quota rule. Hiring an additional (disabled
or non-disabled) worker does not generate the necessary revenue. Firms with residual demand in
the range w < R(Z, T −1) < p, strictly prefer to hire one disabled worker and T −1 non-disabled
workers as hiring T non-disabled worker and no disabled worker would make them subject to
the tax. (Without a quota system, firms in this range are indifferent whether the T th worker is
disabled or non-disabled.) Firms with residual demand p < R(Z) < p + τ are also affected by
the quota system. They hire one disabled and T −1 non-disabled workers (and would have hired
no disabled and T non-disabled workers without a quota). Finally, firms with residual demand
p+ τ < R(Z, T − 1) < P always hire T non-disabled workers. While a quota system forces them
9Both assumptions are well in line with the Austrian system where the tax is on the order of 8 % of monthly
earnings. Moreover, productivity of a disabled worker is likely to be substantially lower than productivity of a
non-disabled worker since disabled individuals have lost at least 50 % of work capacity.
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to pay the tax a non-disabled workers generates higher profits.
Finally, let us look at the decision of firms whether to hire T or T + 1 workers.10 Firms with
low residual demand 0 < R(Z, T ) < w − τ are unaffected by the quota and hire T non-disabled
and no disabled worker. Firms with residual demand w− τ < R(Z, T ) < w hire T non-disabled
workers but are now incentivized to hire one disabled worker. As the quota rule applies, the
marginal cost of hiring a disabled worker is w − τ , smaller than residual demand. (Notice
that this incentive does not exist when choosing between T − 1 and T ). For residual demand
R(Z, T ) > w the choice between T and T + 1 is similar to the one between T − 1 and T.
Figures 1a and 1b summarize how firms adjust employment of disabled and non-disabled
workers in the presence of the quota rule. When p < w (see Figure 1a) firms do no hire a
disabled worker despite the quota. When p > w (see Figure 1b) and residual demand is in range
E firms will not hire a disabled worker in the absence of a quota rule. In the presence of quota,
however, they will hire one disabled worker, provided their optimal employment of non-disabled
workers is at or above the threshold (LN ≥ T ). Similarly, firms with residual demand in range
G do not have an incentive to hire a disabled worker without a quota rule, but will hire one
disabled worker with a quota – provided their optimal employment of non-disabled workers is
just below the threshold or larger (LN ≥ T − 1). Finally, firms with residual demand in range
F and optimal non-disabled employment LN ≥ T − 1 strictly prefer hiring a disabled worker
under a quota system while they are indifferent between a disabled and a non-disabled worker
in the absence of a quota system.
The figures also show which firms will manipulate employment of non-disabled workers in
reaction to the quota rule. Manipulators – firms that locate below the threshold under a quota
system but above in the absence of such a system – include firms with residual demand in ranges
B and G. Firms in range B set non-disabled employment below the threshold to avoid the tax
and do not hire a disabled worker. Firms in range G also set non-disabled employment below
the threshold but they are better off employing a disabled worker as this worker adds to profits.
All other firms do not manipulate.
Consequences of employment manipulation. We have seen that the presence of a quota
rule induces some employers to choose a firm size just below the quota threshold. The key ques-
tion is whether and to what extent such manipulation biases the contrast of mean employment
of disabled workers between threshold firms and firms just below the threshold.
Consider firms hiring at the threshold with observed firm size LN = T under a quota system
10The same logic that applies the decision to employ T or T + 1 non-disabled workers, applies for the decision
to employ T + 1 or T + 2 non-disabled workers, T + 2 or T + 3 non-disabled workers, and so on. This is because
all involved employment level are subject to the same quota rule. Notice further that the choice of firms to hire
T − 1 versus T − 2 non-disabled workers is identical to the in the absence of the quote system, see the discussion
above.
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Figure 1: Employment choices derived from the model
A
do not hire (τ ≥ 0)
B
τ = 0: hire non−disabled
τ > 0: do not hire non−disabled
C
hire non−disabled (τ ≥ 0)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
 fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 R
(Z
,LN
)
 
0 p w w + τ P
 
Residual demand R(Z,LN)
(a) Case 1: p < w
D
do not hire (τ ≥ 0)
E
τ = 0: do not hire
τ > 0: hire disabled
F
hire disabled (τ ≥ 0)
G
τ = 0: hire non−disabled
τ > 0: substitute non−disabled by a disabled
H
hire non−
disabled
(τ ≥ 0)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
 fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 R
(Z
,LN
)
 
0 w − τ w p p + τ P
 
Residual demand R(Z,LN)
(b) Case 2: p > w
in place. Among those firms are manipulators (with residual demand in ranges B and G) and
non-manipulators (all other firms). It is important to note that manipulation due to a quota
system leaves composition of firms at LN = T with respect to employment of disabled workers
essentially unchanged. While there are firms that would have optimally chosen T in the absence
of a quota system, now chose T − 1 as a result of the quota system, there are also firms that
would have optimally chosen T + 1 in the absence of quota system now chose T in the presence
of the system. This means that the composition of threshold remains essentially unchanged. A
substantial bias in the average number of disabled workers hired by threshold firms can be ruled
out.
Now consider firms hiring just below the threshold with observed firm size LN = T −1. These
firms serve to identify the counterfactual disabled employment decisions without a quota rule.
This set of firms also consists of manipulators and non-manipulators. The composition of firms
just below the threshold changes as a result of the quota rule. Firms in range B and in range
G are induced by the quota to bunch at T − 1 but would have chosen T in the absence of
11
quota. How does bunching affect average employment of disabled workers for firms observed
at LN = T − 1? Notice that B-firms are not willing to hire disabled workers, whereas G-firms
are actually hiring disabled workers. Hence two types of bunching create biases in opposite
directions that tend to offset each other. A bias arises when the number of bunching firms is
very large and when the percentage G-firms in all bunching firms (B- plus G-firms) deviates
substantially from the average number of disabled workers below the threshold in the absence
of quota. If the total number of bunching firms is small – or if the B/(B+D)-ratio is similar to
the percentage of (T − 1)-firms hiring disabled workers in the absence of a quota, the contrast
of firms observed at the threshold to firms just below the threshold will not be strongly biased
and will be informative on the impact of the quota rule on employment of disabled workers.
In our empirical analysis below we will estimate the fraction of bunching firms. Using this
estimate, we will be able to bound the estimated threshold-effect for disabled workers assuming
that bunching arises either entirely from B-firms (which would lead to an upward bias) or entirely
from G-firms (which would lead to a downward bias).
4 Empirical Strategy
The first part of this section provides the essential background regarding the data for the em-
pirical analysis. The second part of this section discusses identification and estimation of the
causal effect of the non-compliance tax on disabled employment.
4.1 Data
To assess the impact of the employment quota on firms’ hiring decisions with respect to dis-
abled workers, we use register data from two different sources: (i) the Austrian Social security
database (ASSD), which contains detailed information on the individuals’ employment history
and characteristics from 1972–2003 on a daily basis together with an unambiguous firm iden-
tifier, as well as firms’ industry affiliation and location (see Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009) and (ii)
personal data from the Austrian Federal Welfare Office (FWO) from 1970–2003, which reports
disability status, disability type, and disability degree for all individuals who are disabled in the
context of the DPEA. One advantage of this type of information is that a medical procedure
(rather than self-reported by firms or workers) objectively assesses the disability status. The
ASSD and FWO data can be linked on the basis of an anonymized person identifier. This allows
us to calculate accurately (i) the number of the non-disabled workers and (ii) the number of
disabled workers employed by each firm. The former variables determines whether a firm is
subject to the quota rule and the latter variable shows whether the firm complies. The FWO
checks firms’ compliance with the employment quota on the first day each month. We account
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for this administrative modus operandi by creating a data set with monthly reference dates, all
of which correspond to the first day of each month.11
Our main empirical analysis focuses on the period January 1999 to June 2001. The FWO data
set includes all individuals who acquired the disability status in 1970 or later. This means that
the stock of disabled workers might be incompletely captured in the early years but does not
cause a major problem here as our analysis focuses on the above period. To check the robustness
of our results we use also data for the periods July 1996 to December 1998 and July 2001 to
December 2003 when slightly different rules were in place (see section 2). We further restrict
the analysis to firms in the private sector – those who are likely to pursue a profit-maximizing
objective. In particular, we look at firms operating in the services, manufacturing, construction,
and tourism industries.
Table 2 characterizes disabled individuals in terms of the DPEA (column 1) and contrasts
them to their disabled counterparts in terms of the disability insurance program (DI) (column
2) and to non-disabled individuals (column 3). The sample consists of the universe of working-
age (age 20–65) individuals in Austria (August 2000). Table 2 reveals that the mean degree
of disability (i.e. the reduction in work capacity) for DPEA-disabled amounts to 61.50 % and
that the average duration of the disability is 7.93 years. DPEA-disabled are somewhat more
female than the DI-disabled but have roughly the same years of schooling. DPEA-disabled are
substantially younger than DI-disabled (44.33 vs 57.22 years). The main reason is that DI is
mainly an early retirement program, whereas DPEA tries to integrate severely disabled into the
labor market. Among those who work DPEA-disabled earn substantially more than DI-disabled
(e 66.89 vs e 45.45) and are almost twice as likely white collar.12
4.2 Identification
Our empirical strategy is based on the discontinuously changes in financial incentives for firms
to employ disabled workers. The DPEA requires firms to hire a disabled worker if employment
of non-disabled workers LNi is greater than or equal to the quota threshold T ∈ {25, 50, 75, ...}.
Our aim is to identify the causal effect of the non-compliance quota tax on threshold firms’
disabled employment. In order to understand whether the quota rule has an impact, it is crucial
to understand how firms’ employment decisions of both disabled and non-disabled workers are
affected.
The quota rules provide us with a “threshold design”.13 Our threshold design contrasts em-
11Firms cannot simply hire disabled workers for one day in order to fulfill the quota. In fact, disabled workers
have, on average, a substantially higher tenure than non-disabled workers. Mean (std. dev.) tenure amounts
to 10.3 (8.7) years for disabled and to 6.1 (6.9) years for non-disabled workers, the difference being statistically
highly significant.
12Public sector workers and the self-employed are excluded since we do not observe their wages nor the color
of their collar.
13While our threshold design is closely related to a regression discontinuity design (RDD), our set-up differs
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Table 2: Characterization of disabled (DPEA), disabled (DI), and non-disabled workers
Disabled Disabled Non-disabled
(DPEA) (DI)
Disability
Degree of disability 61.50 n/a –
Years registered as disabled 7.93 n/a –
Personal characteristics
Female 35.92 28.59 47.82
Schooling (in years) 11.43 11.91 12.42
Age (in years) 44.33 57.22 40.08
age < 35 19.66 1.62 37.70
35 ≤ age < 50 45.44 10.50 39.67
50 ≤ age < 55 20.93 11.44 9.28
age ≥ 55 13.97 76.44 13.34
Labor market status (in percent)
Employment 71.52 3.51 82.80
Unemployed 9.16 0.26 4.33
Retirement (disability insurance) 12.03 96.22 –
Retirement (old-age) 1.55 – 7.32
Sick 3.19 – 0.66
Out-of-labor-force 2.55 – 4.90
Number of observations 74,843 232,824 3,695,244
Job-related characteristics
(excluding public sector workers and self-employed)
Daily wage (in Euro) 66.89 42.45 65.45
White-collar 52.40 28.20 54.32
Number of observations 45,187 1,493 2,468,399
Notes: The sample consists of the universe of working-age (age 20–65)
individuals in Austria (August 2000). Source: Own Calculations, based on
ASSD
ployment of disabled workers just below and just above quota thresholds. The identification
strategy builds on the key behavioral assumption that both disabled labor demand and supply
are continuous in non-disabled employment at the threshold. Labor supply of disabled workers
is clearly continuous in firm size because none of the DPEA provisions – except the quota rule
– is conditional on firm size. Moreover, we assume that labor demand would be continuous
in the absence of a quota rule. Since there are no rules – other than the disability quota –
that kick in when firms change employment around thresholds, this is a reasonable assumption.
However, the behavioral framework we develop in section 3 suggests that, in the presence of
disability quota, firms may indeed manipulate employment of non-disabled workers and that
manipulation can lead to either a downward or upward bias in the estimated threshold effect.
Our empirical analysis will therefore report estimates of both the ”threshold effect” (effect of the
quota rule on disabled employment) and the ”bunching effect” (effect of the quota rule on the
density of non-disabled employment across firms). The bunching effect indicates the maximum
number of firms that manipulate their non-disabled employment. Using this estimate, we will
from a RDD since the forcing variable is endogenous in our framework.
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be able to bound the threshold effect.
4.3 Estimation
The basic econometric model for the identification of the threshold effect at threshold T = 25 is
as follows:
LDit = α0 + α1 ·Dit + β0 · L˜Nit + β1 ·Dit · L˜Nit + it,
where LDit denotes the number of disabled workers, Dit = 1(L
N
it ≥ T ) indicates whether a firm
is treated or not, and L˜Nit = L
N
it − T ∈ [−12, 12] denotes the difference between current non-
disabled employment LNit and threshold T = 25 of firm i at date t. Including L˜
N
it is important
since non-disabled employment will turn out to be strongly correlated with disabled employment.
The key parameter is α1. This parameter measures the average causal effect of DPEA on the
number of disabled workers for firms at the quota threshold T . The parameter α0 measures the
average number of disabled workers for firms just below the threshold T and parameters β0 and
β1 capture the correlation between firm size L
N
it and the average number of disabled workers per
firm. We will also use a ‘long’ version of our basic model that includes a vector of covariates
measuring (i) firm size dynamics, (ii) characteristics of firms’ workforce, (iii) firms’ industry
affiliation, (iv) firms’ geographical location (at the state–level), and (v) time fixed effects (see
table 3 for a detailed list of covariates). In addition, we interact (i)–(v) with L˜Nit in order to
allow for different effects of the forcing variable L˜Nit for different types of firms. Inclusion of
these covariates should not affect the estimated discontinuity, if manipulation of LNit is small.
The discrete support of the assignment variable L˜Nit implies that we need to extrapolate in
order to predict the counterfactual for threshold firms, i.e. we need to extrapolate the number
of disabled workers threshold firms employ in the absence of the non-compliance tax.14 The
above econometric model assumes a linear functional form which could be mis-specified. The
empirical analysis below will follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) who suggests two approaches to
assess sensitivity to functional form: adding higher order polynomials to the basic model and
local linear regression (i.e. keep the linear functional form but reduce the bandwidth).
For the investigation of the higher thresholds T > 25, we pool all higher order thresholds and
extend the basic model with a set of threshold dummies Git that indicate the threshold that is
closest to firm i at date t to control for differences in non-disabled employment across normalized
thresholds (note that, for pooled quota thresholds T > 25, L˜Nit denotes the difference between
14Discrete support of the assignment variable also affects the variance-covariance matrix estimates. Lee and
Card (2008) suggest using cluster-consistent standard errors (clustered on the distinct values of LNit ) to account
for the uncertainty related to the choice of the functional form. Furthermore, remember that we use pooled cross-
section data for the econometric analysis. Observations of the same firm cannot be considered to be independent
from each other. Thus, we not only need to cluster on LNit but also on firms (note that this is non-nested).
Miller et al. (2009) propose a new variance estimator for OLS that provides cluster-robust inference when there
is two-way clustering that is non-nested. As a consequence, we report two types of robust standard errors in our
regression outputs: standard errors that are (i) clustered on LNit and (ii) those that are clustered on L
N
it and firms.
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current non-disabled employment Sit and threshold Tit that is closest to firm i at date t.).
15 In
addition, to allow for effect heterogeneity across thresholds, we include interactions between the
threshold dummies Git and (i) the treatment indicator Dit, (ii) the normalized firm size L˜Nit ,
and (iii) the interaction between Dit and L˜Nit . Thus, the treatment effect α1 in this model can
be interpreted as an inverse variance weighted average of the threshold specific treatment effects
(see Angrist, 1998).
4.4 Manipulation Checks
In this subsection we consider whether the quota rule induces firms to manipulate employment of
non-disabled workers. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010) we undertake two manipulation checks
at the quota threshold: (i) inspection of the firm size density and (ii) inspection of baseline
covariates. The intuition behind the former test is that manipulation should be reflected in a
discontinuity in the firm size distribution at the threshold. Our behavioral framework predicts
two types of manipulation both of which lead to ”bunching” below the threshold. Thus we expect
a negative discontinuity in the firm size density at the threshold and report the ”bunching effect”
along with the ”threshold effect” when presenting our main results in section 5.
The intuition behind inspection of covariates is that manipulation should lead to local unbal-
ancedness of baseline covariates around the threshold. Table 3 reports key background statistics
on firms located around the threshold T = 25. The first line provides information on firm
size – the number of jobs provided to non-disabled workers – for firms above (= treated firms)
and below (= control firms) the threshold T = 25. Table 3 indicates that treated firms differ
from control firms. Treated firms are, by construction, larger than control firms. Table 3 also
displays information on firm size dynamics. The firm characteristic “employment stability” in-
dicates whether the work force in month t was subject to any changes since month t − 1. The
characteristic “expanded (contracted) since 6 months” measures whether firm size in month t is
strictly larger (smaller) than firm size in month t− 6. It turns out that the workforce in treated
firms is less stable than in control firms; both the fraction of firms that experienced employment
growth and the fraction of firms that experienced a fall in employment are significantly larger
among treated firms. Table 3 also reveals that there are slight differences in pay, tenure, and the
percentage women, the number of employed apprentices, workers’ age and the age of the firm.
There are only negligible differences in industry composition between treated and control firms.
To shed more light on how treated and control firms differ, Figure 2 plots mean employment
stability (a), mean wage (b), and mean firm age (c) as a function of firm size. Figure 2 clearly
indicates that employment stability is a strongly decreasing monotone function of firm size. Vi-
15Let Git = floor((L
N
it + 12)/25) indicate a firm’s threshold group, i.e. Git = 1 for firms located around the
threshold at firm size 50, Git = 2 for firms located around the threshold at firm size 75, etc.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics around quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 -
June 2001)
below threshold above threshold
mean mean difference discontinuityb,c
Firm size 17.1139 30.1447 13.0308??? n/a
Firm size dynamics
employment stabilitya 0.4092 0.2555 −0.1537??? 0.0121
expanded since 6 monthsa 0.4473 0.4696 0.0223??? −0.0150
contracted since 6 monthsa 0.3408 0.3881 0.0473??? 0.0038
Characteristics of firms’ workforce
log. of median daily wagea (in e) 4.0551 4.1028 0.0477??? 0.0032
tenurea (in years) 5.3589 5.6305 0.2716??? 0.0255
fraction womena 0.4083 0.3743 −0.0341??? 0.0110
fraction white-collara 0.4496 0.4458 −0.0038 0.0151
number of apprenticesa 1.3625 2.0429 0.6804??? −0.0494
workers’ agea 35.4687 35.7083 0.2396??? 0.0376
age of firm (in years) 16.0121 17.0554 1.0433??? 0.0793
Industry
services 0.4556 0.4486 −0.0070 0.0107
manufacturing 0.2764 0.2935 0.0171?? −0.0091
construction 0.1676 0.1718 0.0043 −0.0045
tourism 0.1004 0.0861 −0.0143??? 0.0030
Number of firm–month observations 330,427 117,729 448,156 448,156
Number of firms 22,311 9,058
Total number of firms 25,755
Notes: a denotes that variable bases on characteristics of non-disabled workers only. b The estimated
discontinuity is based on the following model: xit = α0 + α1 ·Dit + β0 · L˜Nit + β1 ·Dit · L˜Nit + it, where
the coefficient α1 detects discontinuities in the mean of characteristics xit.
c The p-values for the estimated
discontinuities are adjusted for multiple testing according to Holm (1979). ???, ??, ? denotes significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively (standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firm size). Source:
Own calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
sual inspection suggests that there is no discontinuity in employment stability at the threshold.
Similar patterns are observed for wage and firm age. We formally test for discontinuities in
baseline covariates implementing our basic econometric model for each of the background char-
acteristics. Column (4) of Table 1 presents the estimate of parameter α1. Strikingly, results
indicate that firms on either side of the T = 25 threshold are perfectly balanced with respect to
observed covariates.
This means that all of the differences in baseline covariates shown in column (3) of table 3 are
not due to purposeful self-selection of firms but rather due to underlying differences in firm size.
Thus, the inspection of baseline covariates does not indicate any manipulation of the firm size
suggesting that the key identifying assumption of our threshold design holds.
5 Econometric Results
In this section we discuss our main results. We start by analyzing the threshold and the bunch-
ing effect at the first threshold (T = 25). We then check robustness on the basis of placebo
17
Figure 2: Selected controls (mean) vs firm size
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Notes: Figure plots the mean of selected controls vs firm size. We selected three controls with
means that vary strongly with firm size. The means of these selected controls but also of those
we do not report are continuous in firm size at the threshold. The same result holds for pooled
thresholds. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
regressions; look for effect heterogeneity; look for the respective effects at higher thresholds
(T = 50, 75, ...); and provide robustness checks on the basis of earlier and later sample periods.
5.1 Results for Quota Threshold T = 25
This section presents the econometric estimates of the effects of quota rule for the first threshold
T = 25.16 Figure 3 reports the number of disabled workers per firm by firm size for sizes ranging
from 13 to 37. The evidence is based on 448,156 firm-month observations, providing information
on the employment decisions of 25,755 firms. The average number of disabled workers employed
by firms increases with firm size. Firms that employ 13 non-disabled workers offer on average
0.14 workplaces to disabled workers whereas firms that employ 37 non-disabled workers provide
16We put our main focus to this threshold for two reasons. First, firms at higher order thresholds are already
subject to the quota system. Studying the first threshold allows analyzing the effects of being subject to or free
of the quota system. Second, there are much fewer firms at higher order thresholds than at the first threshold.
This means that the first threshold is the most relevant threshold in terms of the number of firms subject to the
quota.
18
on average 0.50 jobs to disabled workers. Figure 3 also suggests an approximately linear rela-
tionship. Strikingly, there is a jump in employment of disabled workers at the quota threshold.
While firms with 24 non-disabled workers employ on average 0.31 disabled workers, firms with
25 non-disabled workers offer on average 0.34 jobs to disabled workers.
Figure 3: The effect of the DPEA on the number of disabled workers at quota threshold T = 25
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Notes: Discontinuity at threshold = 0.0533 with (i) standard error = 0.0075 (adjusted for cluster-
ing on firm size) and (ii) standard error = 0.0133 (adjusted for clustering on firm size and firm),
based on the baseline model (number of observations = 448,156). Source: Own calculations,
based on ASSD and FWO.
Table 4 presents the econometric results. Panel A shows our main results for the threshold
effect, i.e. how employment quota affects jobs provided to disabled workers. Column (1) of
table 4 shows results for the basic econometric model. The estimated discontinuity at the quota
threshold T = 25 is 0.0533 (the standard error adjusted for clustering on firm size is 0.0075; the
standard error adjusted for clustering on firm size and firm is 0.0133; see footnote 14 for the
justification of the use of different standard errors). This discontinuity is statistically significant
at the 1%-level. Note that the choice of clustering on the firm size, or on the firm size and firm,
does not affect the statistical significance of our results in any of the four columns.
Column (2) of Panel A shows results for a model extended by the full set of controls, time fixed-
effects, and their respective interaction with firm size. The threshold effect only slightly changes
from 0.0533 to 0.0545. This is not surprising given the local balancedness of these covariates
around threshold T = 25, which we assessed in section 4.4. Again, this is evidence against the
presence of substantial manipulation of the firm size related to the employment quota. Column
(3) narrows the bandwidth to L˜Nit ∈ [−6, 6]. The estimated discontinuity becomes smaller,
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amounting to 0.0373 with this smaller bandwidth. The inclusion of second order polynomials
in L˜Nit in column (4) to the specification in column (2) leads to the same effect as narrowing
the bandwidth. The estimated discontinuity amounts to 0.0366 being almost identical to that
of column (3). Thus, the basic model is sensitive to changes in functional form. The sensitivity
analyzes in column (3) and (4) are, however, quite consistent regarding the causal effect of the
non-compliance tax. We therefore adopt the model in column (3) as the baseline model for the
remainder of the paper. Note that results are not sensitive to adopting the model in column (4).
Table 4: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm at
quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 - June 2001)
Panel A: Threshold effect (dep. var.: number of disabled workers)
Mean 0.2550 0.2550 0.3081 0.2550
Standard deviation 0.6390 0.6390 0.7064 0.6390
Threshold effect 0.0533 0.0545 0.0373 0.0366
Cluster: LN (0.0075)??? (0.0081)??? (0.0075)??? (0.0084)???
Cluster: LN , firm (0.0133)??? (0.0136)??? (0.0091)??? (0.0098)???
LN ∈ 25± h h = 12 h = 12 h = 6 h = 12
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 1 1 1 2
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (LN − 25) No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (LN − 25) No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 448,156 448,156 183,678 448,156
R2 0.0304 0.0697 0.0517 0.0698
Adjusted R2 0.0304 0.0695 0.0512 0.0695
Panel B: Bunching effect (dep. var.: firm size density in percent)
Mean 4.0000 4.0000 7.6923 7.6923
Standard deviation 2.7926 2.7926 2.5369 2.5369
Bunching effect −0.4195?? 0.1464 −0.4646??? −0.2178??
(0.1577) (0.1264) (0.0644) (0.0820)
LN ∈ 25± h h = 12 h = 12 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 2 3 2 3
Number of observations 25 25 13 13
R2 0.9986 0.9997 0.9998 0.9999
Adjusted R2 0.9982 0.9995 0.9996 0.9998
Notes: ???, ??, ? denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
Is the threshold effect quantitatively large? A lower bound on the extent to which firms
substitute disabled workers and non-disabled workers can be calculated as follows. The estimate
of column (3) of the threshold effect suggests that the quota leads to 0.0373 more disabled
workers holding a job in threshold firms – an increase of about 12 % of disabled workforce of
0.31 disabled workers in firms just below the quota threshold. This change in disabled worker
employment is triggered by a non-compliance tax on the order of 8 % of the median non-
disabled worker wage (e 150 in fine per month relative to about e 1,850 in wages per month).
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The elasticity of substitution between disabled workers and non-disabled workers is therefore
at least 1.60.17 As Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) conjecture, disabled and non-disabled workers
are quite strong substitutes. Indeed, small changes in the price lead to large changes in demand
suggesting that a quota policy would not be necessary if wages could be adjusted to account for
differences in productivity. Yet anti-discrimination legislation does not permit firms to adjust
wages for disability status.
We can use these result to interpret these results on the basis of our behavioral framework.
Suppose we can disregard any bias induced by bunching. The fact that the average number of
disabled workers hired even without the tax is 0.31 suggests that 31 % of all firms are indifferent
between hiring a disabled worker and a non-disabled worker (firms populating area F). This
is a sizable proportion of the overall population of firms which can employ disabled workers
productively (i.e. their productivity p exceeds the wage rate w). Moreover, our findings indicate
that roughly 4 out of 100 firms comply with the quota. This means that about 4 percent of all
firms incur a loss from hiring a disabled worker that is no larger than the tax. Taken together,
we find that about 35 % of all threshold firms incur small (or no) losses from hiring disabled
workers. The remaining 65 % of all firms do not comply with the regulation presumably because
the losses from doing so are substantial.
Let us now turn to the bunching effect. Figure 4 reveals no important discontinuity in the
density of non-disabled employment around the quota threshold T = 25. We test for the presence
of a discontinuity in the firm size distribution formally (see McCrary, 2008). Panel B of table
4 shows the bunching effect in more detail and investigates its sensitivity with respect to the
functional form in LN and to the bandwidth h. Column (2) of Panel B uses polynomial order
3 and a bandwidth h = 12. This specification repeats the result already displayed in Figure 4.
Column (1) reduces the polynomial order of 3 to 2 in LN and detects a significant bunching
effect of -0.42. Columns (3) and (4) reduce the bandwidth to h = 6. Again, a significant
bunching effect is detected, amounting to -0.46 with a polynomial order in LN of 2 and to -0.22
with a polynomial order in LN of 3. Hence columns (1), (3) and (4) of Panel B of Table 4
suggest that firms indeed manipulate their non-disabled employment due to the tax, though
this evidence is not completely robust to changes in the specification (see column (2)). We take
column (3) as our benchmark specification. This is the largest statistically significant and thus
most conservative estimate of the bunching effect.
17Recall that the elasticity of substitution is the negative of the percentage change disabled to non-disabled
employment caused by a percentage change in the relative disabled to non-disabled wage. Consider the first
threshold. Disabled to non-disabled employment increases by 0.15 % (effect of 0.0373 divided by threshold firm
size of 25) because the tax reduced the relative wage of a disabled worker by about 7.5 percent (regular monthly
earnings are e 1,850; this means that the tax decreases disabled to non-disabled relative earnings from 1,850 /
1,850 to 1,850 / 2,000). The relative disabled and non-disabled wage is 1 whereas the disabled to non-disabled
employment level stands at 0.31/25. Thus the elasticity of substitution of threshold firms stands at about 1.60
(= −(0.0373/25)/(1850/2000− 1) · 1/(0.31/25)).
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Figure 4: Firm size distribution at quota threshold T = 25
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Notes: Estimated discontinuity = 0.1464 with standard error = 0.1264 (adjusted for clustering
on firm size), based our basic model with a cubic trend in L˜N using the density of the firm size
distribution (in %) as outcome variable (number of observations = 25). Source: Own calculations,
based on ASSD and FWO.
What does the bunching effect of -0.46 imply for our estimated threshold effect? Clearly,
the key identifying assumption of our threshold design does not hold in light of this strategic
behavior of firms. The above behavioral framework suggests that employment manipulation
may lead either to an upward or a downward bias of the threshold effect. Using the estimated
bunching effect in Column (3) of Panel A of Table 4, we are able to provide bounds, assuming
that bunching arises either entirely from B-firms (p < w) or entirely from G-firms (p > w). Note
first that the bunching effect is informative on the absolute number of manipulators. It suggests
that 0.46 percent of the 183,678 firms in the firm size bracket 19–31 manipulate employment. In
other words, there are 427 (= (0.0046 ·183, 678)/2) employment manipulators.18 To get an upper
bound of the threshold effect assume that in all firms disabled workers have a productivity larger
than their wage (p > w). In that case, manipulation of non-disabled employment arises because
firms substitute a non-disabled worker with a disabled worker. This kind of manipulation leads
to an upward bias in the mean number of disabled workers just below the threshold and thus to
a downward bias in the estimated threshold effect. Moving all 427 potential manipulators just
above the threshold thereby retaining their substituted disabled worker and recalculating the
difference in mean disabled employment yields a threshold effect of 0.0861. The raw difference
18Imagine that there are 50 firms on each side of the threshold. Assume now that five firms manipulate their
firm size and thus sort below the threshold. There are now 55 firms to the left and 45 firms to the right of
the threshold. The resulting discontinuity in the number of firms amounts to 10 firms - twice the number of
manipulating firms. This is the reasoning for the division by two.
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in the mean number of disabled workers between firms with non-disabled employment T = 24
and T = 25 is 0.0434, so the bias in the threshold effect amounts to 0.0434− 0.0861 = −0.0427.
To get a lower bound of the threshold effect we assume that manipulation arises only because
the wage of all disabled workers exceeds their productivity (p < w). In that case bunching
arises from firms that sort below the threshold to avoid the non-compliance tax. Reassigning all
427 potential manipulators from T = 24 to T = 25 (manipulators would still hire zero disabled
workers) we recalculate the difference in mean disabled employment and obtain a value of 0.0235.
Consequently, the bias in the threshold effect amounts to 0.0434− 0.0235 = 0.0199.
In sum, our estimated threshold effect is potentially confounded by firm bunching, but the
resulting bias is rather small. Our preferred estimate in Column (3) of Panel A of Table 3
amounts to 0.0373. Using our bounding exercise the upward bias is at most 0.0199 and the
downward bias is at most 0.0427. Hence our simple thought experiment suggests that the
threshold effect is bounded by [0.0138, 0.0800]. We conclude that, taking into employment
manipulation, still leads to a positive threshold effect. In other words, our estimates suggest
that quota rules induce firms to increase employment of disabled workers. Evaluated at average
disabled employed of firms just below the threshold 0.31 this increase is between 4.5 % (=
0.0138/0.31) and 25.8 % (= 0.08/0.31). While employment manipulation biases the threshold
effect, even our most conservative estimate suggests a positive impact of quota on disabled
employment.
5.2 Placebo Regressions
To further assess the validity of the threshold design, we estimate discontinuities in the number
of disabled workers per firm at firm sizes where there should be no discontinuities. Figure 5 shows
the estimated discontinuities (according to our baseline model) for firm sizes 7–35 (including the
true threshold at firm size 25). The pattern is striking. There is a clear-cut peak at the true
threshold, which already begins to grow at around firm size 21 and then flattens out beginning
at firm size 26. Note that this is not surprising – given that there is a true discontinuity at
firm size 25. The bandwidth of our baseline model is 6, thus the discontinuities calculated at
‘placebo’-thresholds 19–24 already consider treated firms.
The estimated discontinuities for the placebo thresholds at firm sizes 7–18 and 31–35, for which
either only treated or only control firm are considered, are in all but five instances (at firm sizes
9, 10, 13, 14, and 34) statistically not different from zero at the 5%-level. Note, however, that
we test a large number of coefficients at once. Therefore we need to adjust the p-values for
the issue of multiple testing. It turns out that once we adjust the p-values for multiple testing
according to Holm (1979), only the estimated discontinuity of the true threshold at firm size 25
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remains statistically significant at the 5%-level.19 This strongly supports the credibility of our
estimated discontinuity at firm size 25.
Figure 5: Testing continuity of mean disabled employment
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Notes: Figure plots the parameter α1 in regression L
D
it = α0+α1 ·Dit+β0 ·L˜Nit+β1 ·Dit ·L˜Nit+it
where LDit is number of disabled and L˜Nit is normalized firm size, i.e. firm size minus threshold,
adopting a half-width h = 6. This parameter measures the difference in actual mean disabled
employment at the threshold compared to mean disabled employment expected from data below
the threshold for each threshold between firm size 7 to firm size 35. Note that all thresholds
except threshold 25 are placebo thresholds. Parameter estimates within the vertical dashed lines
can be affected by the factual discontinuity at firm size 25. Parameter estimates outside the
vertical dashed lines can not be affected by the discontinuity. Source: Own Calculations, based
on ASSD and FWO
5.3 Effects by low-wage and high-wage firms
Next, we turn to discussing heterogeneity of the treatment effect. Panel A of Table 5 reports the
causal effect of the employment quota for firms in different parts of the firm wage distribution
at quota threshold T = 25. We group firms according to the median daily wage paid to their
workers in the period 1999 to 2001. We then allocate each firm–month observation to four
approximately equal sized groups based on the quartiles of the firm wage distribution. These
groups differ strongly in (relative) financial incentives. Whereas the average firm in the first
quartile face a tax of 12.6 % of its firm wage, firms in the top quartile only face a tax of 5.6 %
19We chose the Holm Method, which controls the family-wise error rate (FWE). As pointed out by Romano
et al. (2008), this is the standard approach to account for multiple testing. Romano et al. (2008) argue that
this criterion can be too strict when the number of hypotheses under consideration is very large and propose
to apply the procedure of false discovery proportion (FDP). However, we only test 29 hypotheses at once and
therefore stick to the standard approach. The procedure of the Holm Method is as follows. The p-value of each
estimated discontinuity is ranked from the smallest to the largest. The first p-value is multiplied by the number of
investigated (placebo) threshold (29 in our case). The other p-values are consecutively – according to their rank
– multiplied by the number of investigated (placebo) thresholds less the number of already adjusted p-values.
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of the firm wage (bottom row in table 5).
Table 5: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm by
firms’ median daily wage (quartiles) at quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 -
June 2001)
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
Panel A: Threshold effect (dep. var.: number of disabled workers)
Mean 0.2868 0.3144 0.3033 0.3283
Standard deviation 0.6947 0.7148 0.6882 0.7261
Threshold effect 0.0758 0.0418 0.0261 0.0015
Cluster: LN (0.0241)??? (0.0185)?? (0.0104)?? (0.0076)
Cluster: LN , firm (0.0261)??? (0.0216)? (0.0148)? (0.0095)
LN ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 1 1 1 1
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (LN − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (LN − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 47,575 46,519 43,818 45,766
R2 0.0606 0.0506 0.0642 0.0814
Adjusted R2 0.0585 0.0485 0.0620 0.0793
Tax as % of monthly wage 12.6% 9.0% 7.5% 5.6%
Panel B: Bunching effect (dep. var.: firm size density in percent)
Mean 7.6923 7.6923 7.6923 7.6923
Standard deviation 2.8414 2.9787 2.4155 1.9653
Bunching effect −0.4248?? −0.6161?? 0.1268 −0.9181??
(0.1393) (0.2263) (0.3989) (0.3167)
LN ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 2 2 2 2
Number of observations 13 13 13 13
R2 0.9984 0.9983 0.9969 0.9955
Adjusted R2 0.9973 0.9972 0.9947 0.9923
Bounds for threshold effect [0.0589, 0.1193] [0.0129, 0.0991] n/a [−0.0356, 0.0781]
Notes: ???, ??, ? denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
Results indicate that the employment quota produces a strong increase in disabled employment
in the first quartile of the wage distribution. Firms in the first quartile provide 0.0758 workplaces
for disabled workers which would not be there without the quota (column 1). The estimated
discontinuity decreases continuously with the wage level of the firm and amounts to 0.0418 for
the second quartile (column 2), 0.0261 for the third quartile (column 3) and (insignificant) 0.0015
for the fourth quartile.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the estimates for the bunching effect. Using again the most
conservative specification with bandwidth h = 6 and polynomial order in LN of 2 in terms of
magnitude, bunching is detected for all but the third wage quartile (though the effect is not very
robust with respect to the bandwidth nor the polynomial order). The magnitude of the bunching
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effect seems to be larger the higher we move up in the wage distribution (column 3 being an
outlier). Panel B of Table 5 further displays the bounds for the threshold effect based on the
same thought experiment as above. This suggests that the threshold effect remains positive for
firms in the first and second wage quartile (column 1 and 2).
Note that the pattern of causal effects of the employment quota are very much in line with
the pattern of relative impact generated by a flat rate tax.20 Moreover, about 3 out of 10 firms
hire disabled workers even when they do not face the employment obligation and this does not
vary much across the wage distribution. This is consistent with the productivity loss due to
disability being roughly proportional to the wage rate (or to maximum productivity of an extra
worker). Yet, there appear to be more firms incurring only a small loss from hiring a disabled
worker rather than a non-disabled worker among low wage firms than among high wage firms.
This suggests that the distribution of losses from hiring a disabled worker are more concentrated
for low wage firms and more dispersed for high wage firms. Introducing the same nominal tax
therefore leads to a weaker employment response for high wage firms than for low wage firms.21
5.4 Results for Pooled Quota Thresholds T > 25
The above results were based on firms around the first threshold T = 25. We now investigate the
threshold effect by pooling firms at higher thresholds T > 25. The employment quota may act
differently for large firms than for small firms. On the one hand, large firms pay higher wages,
implying that financial incentives should have less bite than for small firms. On the other hand,
existing evidence strongly suggests that firm size is positively related to employment of the
disabled. This may be because large firms find it easier to accommodate disabled workers.
Table 6 shows the results for pooled higher thresholds (T = 50, 75, ...). Here we assign treat-
ment status according to the deviation from thresholds L˜Nit ≡ (LNit − Tit), where Tit represents
the nearest threshold LNit is associated with. Firms are treated if L˜
N
it ≥ 0 and non-treated if
L˜Nit < 0. Remember from section 4.2 that all specifications in table (6) include threshold dum-
mies Git, as well as their interaction with the treatment indicator Dit and normalized firm size
L˜Nit and Dit · L˜Nit . Thus, the estimated discontinuity can be interpreted as an inverse variance
weighted average of the threshold specific treatment effects. Column 1 shows that the effect
amounts to 0.1387 if no additional covariates are included. The effect falls to 0.1071 (column 2)
when controls, time fixed-effects, and their interactions with L˜Nit are added. The specification of
column 3 uses the smaller bandwidth and the effect vanishes (0.0636). If higher order polynomial
20The implied elasticity is larger for firms that pay low wages than for firms paying high wages (2.1 for firms
in the 1st quartile, 1.5 for firms in the 2nd quartile, 0.9 for firms in the 3rd quartile, and 0 for firms in the 4th
quartile).
21Note that it is important to be careful with this interpretation. There are many other aspects that differ
between firms that pay high and low wages, for instance industry or market environment, that could also be
driving the differences between high and low wage firms.
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are added instead, the effect becomes smaller (0.0775), but is statistically significant at least at
the 10%-level if standard errors adjusted for clustering on the deviation from the threshold L˜N
are considered.22 Panel B of Table (6) shows that no bunching takes place at higher thresholds.
Table 6: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm at
pooled quota thresholds T > 25 (time period: January 1999 - June 2001)
Panel A: Threshold effect (dep. var.: number of disabled workers)
Mean 2.3044 2.3044 2.3833 2.3044
Standard deviation 5.3183 5.3183 5.4524 5.3183
Threshold effect 0.1387 0.1071 0.0636 0.0775
Cluster: L˜N (0.0504)?? (0.0394)?? (0.0425) (0.0419)?
Cluster: L˜N , firm (0.0580)?? (0.0524)?? (0.0490) (0.0706)
LN ∈ T ± h h = 12 h = 12 h = 6 h = 12
Polynomial order in L˜N 1 1 1 2
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Controls · L˜N No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · L˜N No Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies · Da Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies · L˜N Yes Yes Yes Yes
Threshold dummies · L˜N ·Da Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 220,187 220,187 111,746 220,187
R2 0.3859 0.4574 0.4651 0.4574
Adjusted R2 0.3854 0.4568 0.4639 0.4568
Panel B: Bunching effect (dep. var.: firm size density in percent)
Mean 4.0000 4.0000 7.6923 7.6923
Standard deviation 0.7929 0.7929 0.7705 0.7705
Bunching effect −0.0468 −0.0568 −0.1088 −0.0529
(0.0714) (0.0717) (0.1529) (0.1996)
LN ∈ T ± h h = 12 h = 12 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in L˜N 2 3 2 3
Number of observations 25 25 13 13
R2 0.9959 0.9960 0.9796 0.9796
Adjusted R2 0.9948 0.9943 0.9650 0.9512
Notes: a The interaction term between the threshold dummies and the treatment indicator
D is calculated with threshold dummies demeaned by E[Threshold dummyj |D = 1]. ???,
??, ? denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
5.5 Effects by employment status before becoming disabled
This subsection provides separate estimates by the initial state before acquiring the disability
status. We consider disabled workers who, at the date of registration as disabled, were employed
(i) with the same firm (own former employees); (ii) with another firm (other former employees);
22The elasticity for the threshold firm with 100 non-disabled workers is 1.58 (= −(0.0636/100)/(2000/2150 −
1) · 1/((2.3044/4)/100)). Note that average disabled employment is adjusted to reflect that the firm with 100
workers has already passed three thresholds and regular monthly earnings are e 2,000 rather than e 1,850 in
small firms (see footnote 17).
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or (iii) were not employed (non-employees). Providing separate effects for these three groups
sheds light on the mechanism that generates excess disabled employment. Threshold firms may
retain their own former employees, poach employees from other firms, or create new jobs for
workers who were not employed. Encouraging retention is clearly one of the main objectives of
the DPEA (see section 2 above). Retention is also likely to conserve firm specific human capital
more than generating excess employment through hiring from the non-employment pool or from
other firms.23
Column 1 in table 7 displays the baseline effect at the quota threshold T = 25 (we repeat
the estimate in column 3 of table 4 for ease of comparison). Results in column 2 suggest that
threshold firms employ 0.0239 more disabled workers who had already been working for the
firm when they acquired the disability status. This means that about 64 % of the baseline
treatment effect at the quota threshold goes to workers who were already employed by their
current employer. The resulting excess employment likely reflects the role of DPEA in increasing
retention of existing employees. Whether the retention effect represents an increase in total
employment is not clear. Firms may be relabeling existing workers. However, we think that the
retention effect is a true employment effect rather than pure relabeling. First, the process of
acquiring the status of a severely disabled worker is an involved process with a detailed medical
assessment of a workers’ work capacity. Hence relabeling a non-disabled worker as disabled is
unlikely to happen. Second, since acquiring the disability status comes with substantial benefits
to both firms and workers, it is unlikely that an effectively disabled worker postpones acquiring
the legal disability status to a date when the firm passes the quota threshold.
Results in column 3 indicate that quota firms tend to have 0.0127 more employees on their
payrolls who had been employed in different firms when becoming recognized as disabled. This
means that up to 34 % of the treatment effect is generated by reallocating workers from other
firms to firms at the quota threshold. Results in column 4 indicate that threshold firms’ excess
employment is not generated by increased hiring from the non-employment pool.
5.6 Policy Changes
The above results are based on the period January 1999 to June 2001. To further check the
robustness of our results, we also provide evidence for preceding and subsequent time periods.
During the preceding period, July 1996 to December 1998, firms got a bonus for over-compliance
with the quota of e 52–76 per additional disabled worker, whereas during the subsequent period
the non-compliance tax was substantially larger. Column 2 of Table 8 repeats the result for
the baseline period January 1999 to June 2001 for the quota threshold T = 25. Columns 1
23Note, however, that these results do not speak about effects on total employment. Retained workers might
have found work elsewhere, and workers who used to work at other firms may trigger new hiring at these other
firms.
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Table 7: Decomposing the treatment effect by employment status at date of registering as
severely disabled at quota threshold T = 25 (time period: January 1999 - June 2001)
Number of disabled workers
own former other former non-
baseline employees employees employees
Mean 0.3081 0.1688 0.0940 0.0453
Standard deviation 0.7064 0.5069 0.3253 0.2377
Threshold effect 0.0373 0.0239 0.0127 0.0007
Cluster: LN (0.0075)??? (0.0050)??? (0.0018)??? (0.0022)
Cluster: LN , firm (0.0091)??? (0.0055)??? (0.0026)??? (0.0031)
LN ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 1 1 1 1
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (LN − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (LN − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 183,678 183,678 183,678 183,678
R2 0.0517 0.0588 0.0328 0.0126
Adjusted R2 0.0512 0.0583 0.0323 0.0121
Percentage w.r.t. total effect 100 64 34 2
Notes: Own former employees are individuals who had been employed with same em-
ployer at date of registering as severely disabled. Other former employees are workers
who had been employed with another employer at date of registering as severely dis-
abled. Non-employees are workers who had not been employed at date of registering
as severely disabled. ???, ??, ? denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level re-
spectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based
on ASSD and FWO
and 3 shows the corresponding results for the preceding and subsequent period. The results
are supportive for our basic findings. The estimated discontinuity in column is with 0.0244,
roughly two-thirds as big as in the baseline period. This can be explained by the bonus for over-
compliance creates incentives for firms that are below the quota threshold to hire a disabled
but left incentives of firms above the threshold unaffected. Column 3 of table 8 shows that the
threshold effect in the subsequent period is substantially larger than that of the baseline period,
consistent with incentives from the higher non-compliance tax during that period. Column 4
pools the entire time period from July 1996 to December 2003 with full interactions with a
dummy for period 1 and period 3. Results indicate that the difference between period 2 and 3
is statistically significant at least at the 10%-level (irrespectively of the type of standard error).
This is in line with Wuellrich (2010) who finds that the increase in the non-compliance tax had
a positive impact on firms’ demand for disabled workers. The difference between baseline and
preceding periods (columns 1 and 2), however, is not significant, if simultaneous clustering on
firm and firm size is taken into account.
Panel B of table 8 indicates that the bunching effect in period 1 and 2 is very similar in mag-
nitude. Surprisingly, the bunching effect in period 3 becomes statistically insignificant despite
of the higher non-compliance tax. Again, the bunching results are not very robust to changes
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Table 8: The effect of the employment quota on the number of disabled workers per firm for
different time periods
Number of disabled workers
Jul 1996 – Jan 1999 – Jul 2001 – Jul 1996 –
Dec 1998 Jun 2001 Dec 2003 Dec 2003
Panel A: Threshold effect (dep. var.: number of disabled workers)
Mean 0.2735 0.3081 0.3373 0.3070
Standard deviation 0.6435 0.7064 0.7701 0.7105
Threshold effect 0.0244 0.0373 0.0607 0.0373
Cluster: LN (0.0054)??? (0.0075)??? (0.0094)??? (0.0075)???
Cluster: LN , firm (0.0061)??? (0.0091)??? (0.0103)??? (0.0091)???
Threshold effect · Period 1 −0.0129
Cluster: LN (0.0072)?
Cluster: LN , firm (0.0106)
Threshold effect · Period 3 0.0234
Cluster: LN (0.0105)??
Cluster: LN , firm (0.0139)?
LN ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 1 1 1 1
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls · (LN − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed–effects · (LN − 25) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 179,968 183,678 192,953 556,599
R2 0.0500 0.0517 0.0465 0.0504
Adjusted R2 0.0495 0.0512 0.0460 0.0499
Amount of non-compliance tax (in e) 142 – 146 148 – 150 196 –
Bonus for over-complying (in e) 52 – 76 n/a n/a –
Probationary period (in months) 1 3 6 –
Panel B: Bunching effect (dep. var.: firm size density in percent)
Mean 7.6923 7.6923 7.6923 7.6923
Standard deviation 2.5520 2.5369 2.4997 2.4622
Bunching effect −0.3776?? −0.4646??? −0.1179 −0.4646???
(0.1432) (0.0644) (0.1018) (0.0662)
Bunching effect · Period 1 0.0870
(0.1226)
Bunching effect · Period 3 0.3466??
(0.1495)
LN ∈ 25± h h = 6 h = 6 h = 6 h = 6
Polynomial order in (LN − 25) 2 2 2 2
Number of observations 13 13 13 39
R2 0.9991 0.9998 0.9994 0.9994
Adjusted R2 0.9985 0.9996 0.9990 0.9990
Bounds for threshold effect [0.0102, 0.0610] [0.0138, 0.0800] n/a –
Notes: ???, ??, ? denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Source: Own Calculations, based on ASSD and FWO
in the specification. No bunching is detected in either period if we use e.g. a specification with
a larger bandwidth and higher polynomials. However, even the bounds derived from the most
conservative estimates of the bunching effect displayed in panel B of table 8 show that our
estimated threshold effects remain qualitatively valid.
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5.7 Wage Determination for Disabled Workers
The evidence so far suggests that threshold firms do react to financial incentives. A key element
of shaping demand for disabled workers is the wage paid to disabled workers. The DPEA states
that disabled workers must be offered the same contract as non-disabled workers. This implies
that firms cannot set wages for job entrants differently for disabled and non-disabled workers.
But firms may affect wage growth within firms through promotion decisions. We carried out
an in-depth analysis of the determinants of the wages of disabled workers. This section briefly
summarizes the results.24 Among white-collar workers, the disabled earn 14.8 percent less than
the non-disabled. Among blue-collar workers the wage gap between disabled and non-disabled
workers is twice as large (28.6 percent). The wage gap among white-collar workers does not
result from lower starting wages (we do not find any differences in the starting wage), but rather
accumulates over time as disabled are less remunerated for each year of tenure. This suggests
that disabled white-collar workers are either less promoted or sort into jobs with worse prospect.
In contrast, the wage gap among blue-collar workers is not only the result of different returns
to tenure but also to gaps in the starting wage (the gap in the starting wage is 12 percent).
We conclude that there are substantial wage differentials, but they are most likely not large
enough to compensate the productivity differences. This creates the necessary margin for the
employment quota to affect firms’ demand for disabled workers in the first place (if the wage
gap was bigger than the productivity difference all firms would comply).
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of an employment quota in promoting employment for disabled
workers. While there is a considerable literature on the effects of anti-discrimination legislation,
convincing causal evidence of employment quota systems is almost non-existent. Our paper
makes a first attempt to understand the role of employment quota for disabled workers in shap-
ing the marginal firms’ demand for disabled employment. This analysis complements existing
evidence on anti-discrimination legislation.
The identification strategy relies on the sharp discontinuity in the relative costs of employing
disabled and non-disabled workers created in a quota system combined with taxes raised on
firms that do not comply with legal employment requirements. We adopt a threshold design,
which – in contrast to a RDD – accounts for the fact that the forcing variable (firm size) may
be endogenous. Firms may adjust their non-disabled workforce when faced with the financial
sanctions stipulated by the quota rule. We derive from a simple behavioral framework that firms
24In an online appendix we provide the details of this in-depth analysis of the determinants of the wages of
disabled workers.
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may indeed manipulate their non-disabled workforce due to the tax, which is a violation of the
key identifying assumption of our threshold design. The simple behavioral framework further
suggests that this manipulation can either lead to an downward or upward bias in the estimated
threshold effect, depending on whether disabled workers are productive or not. Based on these
predictions as well as on estimates about the extent to which firms manipulate their non-disabled
workforce we are able to provide an lower and upper bound for the threshold effect. It turns out
that these bounds are still informative in the sense that our results hold in qualitative terms.
We conclude that the application of a threshold design is sufficiently valid in our set-up.
Our results indicate that the quota promotes the employment of disabled workers in firms
located at quota thresholds. The quota leads to excess employment of 0.04 or loosely speaking
to the employment of one more disabled worker per 25 threshold firms around threshold T = 25.
We also detect important interactions between wages and firm size. Firms in the lower tail of
the firm wage distribution tend to provide most of the excess employment to disabled workers.
The employment quota leads to twice as much excess employment among larger firms (the effect
is imprecisely estimated though). We also find that the quota boosts employment primarily
among former employees of the firm, which suggests that retention of disabled workers, one of
the DPEA’s main goals, is achieved. The quota also encourages firms to poach workers from
other firms but does not lead to hirings from non-employment. In addition, two reforms suggest
that raising the non-compliance tax increases excess disabled employment, while paying a bonus
to over-complying firms dampens the employment effects of the non-compliance tax.
We conclude that the financial sanctions accompanying the employment quota do indeed in-
crease compliance with the quota. This is a first result that is necessary for the quota to
promote overall employment for disabled workers. We also show that the quota employment
effect is not entirely due to reallocation of disabled workers between firms. Taken together, these
results suggest that overall disabled employment may increase due to the employment quota.
However, the employment quota may also displace non-disabled workers leading to ambiguous
effects on overall employment. Further research should therefore put emphasis on evaluating
this policy instrument in other contexts and compare the relative effectiveness of quota with
anti-discrimination legislation.
32
References
Acemoglu, D. and Angrist, J. (2001). Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. Journal of Political Economy , 109(5), 915–957.
Angrist, J. (1998). Estimating the labor market impact of voluntary military service using social
security data on military applicants. Econometrica, pages 249–288.
Angrist, J. and Lavy, V. (1999). Using Maimonides’ Rule to Estimate The Effect of Class Size
on Scholastic Achievement*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2), 533–575.
Beegle, K. and Stock, W. (2003). The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws.
Journal of Human Resources, 38(4), 806.
Bell, D. and Heitmueller, A. (2009). The Disability Discrimination Act in the UK: Helping or
hindering employment among the disabled? Journal of health economics, 28(2), 465–480.
Bertrand, M. and Kramarz, F. (2002). Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence
from the French Retail Industry*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1369–1413.
Borgarello, A., Garibaldi, P., and Pacelli, L. (2004). Employment protection legislation and the
size of firms. Il Giornale degli Economisti , 1.
DeLeire, T. (2000). The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Journal of Human Resources, 35(4), 693–715.
DiNardo, J. and Lee, D. (2004). Economic Impacts of New Unionization on Private Sector
Employers: 1984-2001*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1383–1441.
Dyk, I., Bauernberger-Kiesl, A., and Jenner, E. (2002). Arbeitsmarktchancen fu¨r Menschen mit
Behinderung. Johannes-Kepler University Linz .
Hamermesh, D. (1993). Labor demand . Princeton University Press.
Holm, S. (1979). A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. Scandinavian Journal
of Statistics, 6(2), 65–70.
Humer, B., Wuellrich, J., and Zweimu¨ller, J. (2007). Integrating Severely Disabled Individuals
into the Labour Market: The Austrian Case. IZA Discussion Papers 2649, Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA).
Ichino, A. and Riphahn, R. (2005). The effect of employment protection on worker effort:
Absenteeism during and after probation. Journal of the European Economic Association,
3(1), 120–143.
33
Imbens, G. and Lemieux, T. (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice.
Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 615–635.
Jolls, C. (2004). Identifying the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act Using State-
Law Variation: Preliminary Evidence on Educational Participation Effects. The American
Economic Review , 94(2), 447–453.
Jolls, C. and Prescott, J. (2004). Disaggregating employment protection: The case of disability
discrimination. Working Paper 10740, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kruse, D. and Schur, L. (2003). Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA.
Industrial Relations, 42(1), 31–66.
Lalive, R. (2008). How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration? A regression
discontinuity approach. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 785–806.
Lechner, M. and Vazquez-Alvarez, R. (2009). The effect of disability on labour market outcomes
in Germany. Applied Economics.
Lee, D. and Card, D. (2008). Regression discontinuity inference with specification error. Journal
of Econometrics, 142(2), 655–674.
Lee, D. S. and Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal of
Economic Literature, 48(2), 281–355.
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design:
A density test. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 698–714.
Miller, D., Cameron, A. C., and Gelbach, J. (2009). Robust inference with multi-way clustering.
Working Papers 09-9, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics.
OECD (2003). Transforming disability into ability: Policies to promote work and income security
for disabled people. Technical report, OECD.
Romano, J., Shaikh, A., and Wolf, M. (2008). Formalized Data Snooping Based On Generalized
Error Rates. Econometric Theory , 24(02), 404–447.
Staubli, S. (2010). The Impact of Stricter Criteria for Disability Insurance on Labor Force
Participation. mimeo.
Verick, S. (2004). Do financial incentives promote the employment of the disabled? IZA
Discussion Papers 1256, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
34
Wagner, J., Schnabel, C., and Ko¨lling, A. (2001). Threshold values in german labor law and job
dynamics in small firms: The case of the disability law. IZA Discussion Papers 386, Institute
for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Welch, F. (1976). Employment quotas for minorities. Journal of Political Economy , 84(4),
105–141.
Wuellrich, J. (2010). The effects of increasing financial incentives for firms to promote employ-
ment of disabled workers. Economics Letters, 107(2), 173–176.
Zweimu¨ller, J., Winter-Ebmer, R., Lalive, R., Kuhn, A., Wuellrich, J.-P., Ruf, O., and Bu¨chi,
S. (2009). Austrian social security database. Working paper no. 0903, NRN: The Austrian
Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State.
35
